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THE CANARY IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE MINESHAFT:  A 
REVIEW OF RECENT SEXUAL ASSAULT COURTS-MARTIAL 
TAINTED BY UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE 
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Visger*  
“[D]ue to the patent and intolerable efforts to manipulate the 
member selection process, contra every requirement of the law, the 
failures of the military judge, the [post-trial hearing] military judge, 
and the [lower appellate court], to investigate, recognize or 
ameliorate the clear court stacking in this case, and the actual 
prejudice to the Appellant of being tried by a panel cherry-picked for 
the Government, dismissal with prejudice is the only remedy that can 
eradicate the unlawful command influence and ensure the public 
perception of fairness in the military justice system.” 
–U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, reversing a forcible 
rape conviction and dismissing with prejudice.1  
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1.   United States v. Riesbeck, 77 M.J. 154, 167 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the seventeen-month period from May 2017-September 2018, 
military appellate courts reversed five sexual assault convictions 
based on the legal doctrine of Unlawful Command Influence (UCI).2  
This doctrine is designed to protect accused military members who 
are facing court-martial by ensuring that the decision-maker involved 
in a court-martial decides the case based on its merits rather than based 
on the desires of commanding officers.3  Two recent sexual assault 
cases have been significantly influenced by concerns of UCI, 
including the high-profile court-martial of Brigadier General Jeff 
Sinclair.4  Of particular note is the court-martial of United States v. 
Riesbeck, where the civilian Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
(CAAF) reversed a forcible rape conviction with prejudice for “court-
stacking” (specifically, intentionally selecting female panel members 
(e.g., jurors) with the objective of increasing the chances of conviction 
in a sexual assault case) using the very strong language noted in the 
preamble to this article.5   
Additionally, a recent Department of Defense report on the 
prosecution of sexual assault cases raised concerns that the political 
 
2.   See infra notes 112-117 and 142-194 and accompanying text.   
3.   See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.   
4.   See infra notes 103-111 and accompanying text. 
5.   Riesbeck, 77 M.J. at 167. 2
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fight over the military handling of sexual assault prosecutions is 
bleeding over and potentially affecting the fairness of the trial process 
itself.6  All of these cases are tied to the military’s efforts to retain 
jurisdiction over court-martial prosecutions after congressional 
threats to remove jurisdiction due to the military’s mishandling of 
sexual assault prosecutions.7  This article will examine whether the 
five cases profiled in this article are in effect the “dead canary in the 
mineshaft” indicating that serious problems exist with the 
fundamental integrity of the court-martial process.  
The doctrine of UCI addresses the fundamental tension of the 
military justice system—the tension between enforcing discipline and 
ensuring due process.8  Members of the military are drilled in the 
requirement for obedience to a superior’s orders. 9   Given this 
emphasis on obedience, one may question how a military legal 
proceeding can ever provide impartial due process—should not the 
military jury simply defer to what the commander wants?10  During 
World War II, commanders adopted this approach by taking 
advantage of their broad power over the court-martial process to direct 
the desired outcome at trial.11  This approach resulted in a strong cry 
for reform after World War II, resulting in Congress codifying the 
prohibition of commanders interference in the court-martial process 
as part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950.12  
Since then, military appellate courts have deemed UCI to be the 
“mortal enemy of military justice,”13 and for good reason.  One cannot 
trust the integrity of the court-martial process if there are indicators 
that the decision-makers are being influenced by their commanding 
officers, explicitly or implicitly, to reach a particular outcome.  Such 
finders of fact are not deciding the case based on the merits and 
evidence, and the integrity of the process is justly called into question.   
 
6.   JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PANEL SUBCOMM., REPORT ON THE BARRIERS TO 
THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES, 
(May 12, 2017), https://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/08-
Panel_Reports/JPP_SubcommReport_Barriers_Final_20170512.pdf (hereafter, 
JPP Report).   
7.   See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
8.   See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
9.   Id. 
10.   See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
11.   See LUTHER WEST, THEY CALL IT JUSTICE 39-45 (1977) (detailing the 
abuses during World War II).   
12.   Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 506, 64 Stat. 107 (codified 
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2012)). 
13.   United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986). 3
Visger: The Canary in the Military Justice Mineshaft: A Review of Recent
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
62 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [41 
In the past several years, the problem of UCI has again come into 
focus, this time in the political controversy surrounding the military’s 
handling of sexual assault prosecutions.14  Congress has taken a strong 
interest in the military’s handling of sexual assault prosecutions after 
criticism that the military was not taking these cases seriously.15  The 
political maneuvering that has taken place as a result of this 
heightened focus has resulted in UCI becoming an issue once again.16  
Military leadership has reacted strongly to congressional criticism of 
its handling of sexual assault cases, motivated in significant part by 
their desire to retain commander jurisdiction over the court-martial 
process and not cede the process to either civilian or JAG control 
(which has been proposed).17   The military commanders view the 
court-martial power as an instrument of command, essential to 
ensuring discipline in the unit, so that the commander is able to 
achieve the mission—ultimately victory at war.18  This desire to retain 
jurisdiction then creates a situation in which military leaders respond 
to Congressional criticism and attempts to remove jurisdiction by 
demonstrating that they are taking strong action against sexual assault 
in order to obtain a desired political outcome (e.g., retention of court-
martial jurisdiction). 19   In addition, congressional oversight has 
moved beyond legislative reforms.  More recently, Congress has 
injected itself into ongoing or recently-completed sexual assault 
courts-martial and has taken unfavorable action against commanders 
for their decisions in specific courts-martial.20         
The conflict between Congress and military leadership over 
commander jurisdiction has created a climate where these political 
considerations create the potential to substantively influence legal 
decisions in specific courts-martial.  First, military members feel 
pressure to fall in line with their leadership’s “get tough” attitude and 
thereby preserve commander jurisdiction.21  In response to threats to 
remove jurisdiction, military leaders fight to retain jurisdiction by 
cracking down on sexual assault.  This message is transmitted to 
military members who sit on the military panels (akin to civilian 
juries).  This political fight then creates very real pressures on 
 
14.   See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.  
15.   Id. 
16.   See infra notes 98-121 and accompanying text. 
17.   Id.  
18.   WEST, supra note 11, at 16-17. 
19.   See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
20.   Id. 
21.   See infra notes 98-121 and accompanying text. 4
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 41 [2020], Art. 3
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol41/iss1/3
Fall 2019] Visger 63 
members of a court-martial (who are well-aware of the political stakes 
and of their commander’s position) to convict an accused defendant 
regardless of the strength of the evidence and sentence harshly.22     
Second, military members may be concerned about ramifications 
to their personal careers from congressional action as a result of 
decisions they make in sexual assault cases.  This concern arises 
because Congress has approval authority over military promotions 
and nominations to key leadership positions.  While UCI is prohibited 
by the UCMJ,23 this prohibition by its terms only applies to military 
members and does not address potential interference by Congress.  
Consider the following hypothetical case to demonstrate the 
problem:  a Colonel, who has been selected for promotion to General 
but whose promotion is pending Senate confirmation, is the ranking 
officer presiding over a military panel (jury) for a high-profile sexual 
assault court-martial. This court-martial has garnered national media 
and congressional scrutiny.  During the panel’s deliberations, she is 
inclined to vote for acquittal, as she is not personally convinced by the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused defendant 
committed the sexual assault.  However, she is concerned about 
whether her promotion will be held up in the Senate if the panel 
acquits.  In addition, she is concerned that a not-guilty verdict in this 
case might prompt Congress to remove UCMJ jurisdiction from 
commanders, something she knows her chain of command opposes.  
She considers whether she should change her vote to “guilty” and 
pressure lower-ranking members of the panel to also vote for guilt.  
Ultimately, she votes her conscience and the accused is acquitted.  But 
in response to this verdict, a Senator puts a hold on her promotion, 
effectively killing her chances of promotion to General.24   
If this hypothetical Colonel had been removed from the promotion 
list by her military superiors based on the outcome of the court-
martial, she would be a victim of UCI because this action is explicitly 
prohibited by Article 37(a) of the UCMJ.25  She would likely be able 
to pursue legal recourse.  Despite this fact, there is nothing preventing 
Congress from engaging in similar behavior by rejecting her selection 
for promotion.  Such an act by Congress would not be command 
influence because the “command influence” came from congressional 
 
22.   Id. 
23.   10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (2012). 
24.   This scenario took place in a slightly different context, mutatis mutandis, 
in the case of Lieutenant General Susan Helms.  See infra note 96 and accompanying 
text.   
25.   See infra note 45 and accompanying text.   5
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sources and Article 37 only extends to persons subject to the UCMJ 
(in fact, Congress has significant constitutional prerogatives over the 
confirmation process).  Despite this fact, “congressional command 
influence” along these lines has the same potential to undermine 
fairness and due process by bringing outside pressures into judicial 
decisions on the merits of particular cases.  The consequences of 
“congressional command influence” are no different than Article 37 
command influence—Congress has significant power to influence the 
career path of military officers, particularly through their confirmation 
to high-ranking positions and their approval of all military promotions 
for officers.   
This article will examine the five sexual assault cases mentioned 
above and the greater context in which they were decided.  The article 
will begin by examining the origins of the doctrine of unlawful 
command influence in the aftermath of World War II, which 
originated in direct response to commanders’ attempts to actively 
direct the outcome of specific courts-martial.  It will then turn to the 
congressional effort to remove court-martial jurisdiction from 
commanders, with a focus on decisions made by Air Force Lieutenant 
General Franklin in two sexual assault courts-martial and the 
repercussions he faced as a result.  Finally, the article will review the 
JPP report findings as well as the recent appellate court decisions and 
conclude with observations for addressing these concerns.   
II. HISTORY OF THE UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE DOCTRINE 
A. Historical Context 
The earliest approaches to military justice placed the system 
squarely within the province of the commander.  The needs of 
discipline and following orders, sometimes to the death, require that 
“offending soldiers be quickly and harshly dealt with.” 26   In his 
seminal work on Military Law, William Winthrop stated that courts-
martial are “instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by 
Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in 
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline 
therein.”27  Discipline, being necessary to ensure effective military 
action, was indispensable to producing victory on the battlefield.28 
 
26.  WEST, supra note 11, at 16. 
27.  WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW VOL. 1., 53 (1886). 
28.  WILLIAM T. GENEROUS, JR., SWORDS AND SCALES:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 4 (1973). 6
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This need created tension with the concept of justice and required 
lawmakers to delicately balance both the need for justice and the need 
for effective discipline.29   
The dichotomy between justice and discipline was brought into 
the limelight during World Wars I and II as broad swaths of the public 
were drafted and exposed to the court-martial process.  They did not 
like what they saw.30  In World War I, one-third of all court-martial 
acquittals were returned by the convening authority to the court-
martial with a directive to change the verdict to guilty.31  This practice 
was subsequently prohibited by the 1920 Articles of War enacted by 
Congress.32  After World War I, the acting Judge Advocate General 
Samuel Ansell championed additional reforms to the military justice 
system. 33   Some of the reforms, to include JAG review of all 
completed courts-martial and appointed defense counsel for accused 
defendants, were included in the Articles of War.34  But many of 
Ansell’s proposals were rejected.35    
These reforms were tested in World War II and proved insufficient 
to restrain command influence. 36   Commanding Generals broadly 
controlled the court-martial process—they convened the court-
martial, designated the individuals who heard the case, as well as the 
prosecutor and defense counsel (none of which were required to be 
attorneys).37  These commanders expected convictions and maximum 
sentences, signaling their displeasure at any result less than this.38  
Because the commanding general was in a position to control 
practically every aspect of their subordinates’ lives, the court-martial 
produced the expected results—convictions and harsh sentences.39  
During post-war studies of military justice, commanders openly 
admitted to deliberately influencing the court-martial process—
frequently directing court members to adjudge the maximum sentence 
so that the commander could adjust the sentence downward where he 
thought it appropriate.40  The injustices that were observed during 
 
29.   Id.  
30.   Id. at 14-15.   
31.   Id. at 8.   
32.   Id. at 10.  
33.   Id. at 7-10. 
34.   Id. at 9-10. 
35.   Id. at 10.   
36.   WEST, supra note 11, at 43-45.   
37.   Id. at 36. 
38.   Id.  
39.   Id. at 43. 
40.   Id.  7
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World War II prompted a broad outcry for reform from a number of 
sources, from the American Legion to the New York City Bar 
Association.41   
B. UCMJ provisions 
The push for reform resulted in Congress passing the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice in 1950. 42   In addition to substantively 
prohibiting UCI in Article 37, the UCMJ attempted to limit UCI 
through multiple measures:  (1) the general court-martial (the highest 
level of court-martial) was required to have qualified attorneys serve 
as the prosecutor, defense counsel, and law member (the precursor to 
the military judge); (2) one-third enlisted representation on the court-
martial panel was required in cases of enlisted accused; (3) a civilian 
court of last resort, the Court of Military Appeals (later renamed the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces), was established to provide 
impartial civilian oversight of the system.43  The Court of Military 
Appeals was specifically included to serve as “a further bulwark 
against impermissible unlawful command influence.”44  Article 37’s 
UCI prohibitions were quite robust: 
No authority convening a general, special, or summary 
court-martial, nor any other commanding officer, may 
censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any 
member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with 
respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the 
court, or with respect to any other exercises of its or his 
functions in the conduct of the proceedings.  No person 
subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any 
unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-
martial or any other military tribunal or any member 
thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any 
case, or the action of any convening, approving, or 
reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts.45 
 
41.   GENEROUS, supra note 28, at 23-24.  
42.   Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) 
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C Code §§ 801-946a).  
43.   GENEROUS, supra note 28, at 42, 50. 
44.   Thomas, 22 M.J. at 246.  
45.   UCMJ art. 37(a), 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (2012). 8
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 This last reference to an authority’s judicial acts is significant 
as it relates to a commander’s decision to refer a case to a court-martial 
(in other words, send a case to trial).  This authority reflects the 
unusual role of the commander who, as the convening authority, 
decides whether trial by court-martial is appropriate and refers the 
case to court-martial.  This referral decision is simultaneously a 
judicial determination and an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  The 
legal standard for referral is stated in Rule for Courts-Martial 
(R.C.M.) 601(d)(1): “there is probable cause to believe that an offense 
triable by a court-martial has been committed and that the accused 
committed it.”46   
The convening authority’s decision that the standard has been met 
and to refer charges to court-martial is essentially a judicial decision.  
Its judicial quality has been repeatedly recognized by the military 
appellate courts.47  However, referral is defined as “the order of a 
convening authority that charges against an accused will be tried by a 
specified court-martial”48--essentially a prosecutorial decision.  An 
additional judicial decision was historically rendered after the trial if 
an accused was convicted and sentenced.  In such cases, the 
commander has historically had discretion after trial to disapprove the 
findings of guilt or to approve a lesser sentence than that adjudged by 
the court-martial. 49   This post-trial authority took place while the 
convening authority took final action on the findings and sentence. At 
that point, the commander could disapprove guilty findings and/or 
reduce the sentence.50   
This post-trial action authority has recently been rescinded by 
Congress in reaction to convening authority actions which 
disapproved sexual assault convictions.51  As will be noted later in the 
article, this judicial authority that commanders exercise is significant 
due to the adverse consequences that Congress has imposed on 
 
46.   MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 601(d)(1) 
(2019) (hereinafter MCM).   
47.   See United States v. Nealy, 71 M.J. 73, 78 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (Baker, C.J., 
concurring in the result) (“the convening authority plays a central role as . . . quasi-
judicial decision maker.”); United States v. Pringle, 41 C.M.R. 324, 326 (C.M.A. 
1970) (“In referring a case to trial, the convening authority acts in a judicial 
capacity.”); United States v. Nix, 36 C.M.R. 77, 78 (C.M.A. 1965) (“In military law, 
the convening authority performs a number of judicial functions.”). 
48.   MCM, supra note 46, R.C.M. 601(a).   
49.   10 U.S.C. §860(c) (2012), amended by National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2014, § 1702(c), Pub. L. 113-66, 127 Stat. 955 (2013).  
50.   Id.  
51.   See infra notes 80-97 and accompanying text. 9
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officers’ careers resulting from those officers’ judicial decisions in 
specific courts-martial (e.g., decisions whether to refer the case to 
court-martial or approve the adjudged findings and sentence). 
Despite the reforms enacted by the UCMJ in 1950, a commander 
still exercised broad control over the court-martial process. The 
commander still selected the members, prosecutor, defense counsel 
and law member.52  While this authority allowed the commander to 
still exercise subtle means of control over the process,53 Congress 
deemed this process necessary to ensure that the military justice 
system could operate during a wartime environment.54  Subsequent 
reforms created the office of the military judge and moved military 
judges from convening authority control.55  Despite this fact, criticism 
has continued to be levied against the process whereby the convening 
authority personally selects the members who serve as jurors on the 
case.56         
C. Current Doctrine 
While the UCMJ was being considered in the 1950s, critics argued 
that a mere statutory prohibition of UCI was insufficient and that more 
was needed to prevent UCI.  The Stanford Law Review in 1950 
memorably argued that a mere legal prohibition of UCI “is about as 
effective as outlawing sin.” 57   Proponents of continued command 
control responded by arguing that “[y]ou cannot maintain discipline 
by administering justice.”58  Congress settled the debate by allowing 
commanders to continue to administer the military justice system but 
added controls to prevent abuses.  The most significant control was a 
civilian appellate court of last resort, the Court of Military Appeals 
(now called the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).59   Further, 
 
52.   GENEROUS, supra note 28, at 51.   
53.   Id. at 36-37.   
54.   Major Christopher Behan, Don’t Tug on Superman’s Cape: In Defense of 
Convening Authority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Members, 176 
MILITARY L. REV. 190, 223-224 (2003).   
55.   See 10 U.S.C. § 826 (c)(3)(A) (2012) (requiring military judges to be 
“directly responsible to the Judge Advocate General, or his designee” in the 
performance of military judge duties).   
56.   See Behan, supra note 54, at 243-276 (detailing the objections to 
convening authority selection of panel member and the contrary arguments).  
57.   Can Military Trials Be Fair? Command Influence over Courts-Martial, 2 
STAN. L. REV. 547, 550 (1950) (hereinafter Can Military Trials Be Fair?).   
58.   GENEROUS, supra note 28, at 48.   
59.   Id. at 44-45.   10
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as will be detailed below, this court has aggressively developed the 
doctrine of UCI, interpreting the Article 37 prohibition on UCI 
expansively to help insulate the military justice system from 
command influence.   
As the doctrine of unlawful command influence evolved, courts 
identified two separate types of UCI—actual UCI and apparent UCI. 
Actual command influence is “an improper manipulation of the 
criminal justice process which negatively affects the fair handling 
and/or disposition of a case.”60 In addition to actual interference in a 
specific case, the Court of Military Appeals developed the doctrine of 
apparent command influence in 1964, utilizing the doctrine to reverse 
a conviction, stating that “[t]he appearance, or the existence, of 
command influence provides a presumption of prejudice.” 61  This 
standard evolved over the years and apparent command influence is 
now defined as one that “placed an ‘intolerable strain’ on the public’s 
perception of the military justice system because ‘an objective, 
disinterested observer, fully informed of all the facts and 
circumstances, would harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of 
the proceeding.’”62   
In addition to this generous standard for apparent UCI, the 
evidentiary and procedural rules also favor an accused raising this 
claim. All that is required from an accused is “ ‘some evidence’ that 
unlawful command influence occurred.”63  The defense must show 
more than “mere allegation or speculation,”64 but once they do, the 
burden shifts to the prosecution to rebut the claim beyond a reasonable 
doubt.65 The government may do so in one of three ways—prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
[(1)] the predicate facts . . . do not exist, or [(2)] the 
facts as presented do not constitute unlawful command 
influence . . . or [(3)] the unlawful command influence 
did not place an intolerable strain upon the public’s 
perception of the military justice system and that an 
objective disinterested observer, fully informed of all 
the facts and circumstances would [not] harbor a 
 
60.   United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 247 (C.A.A.F. 2017). 
61.   United States v. Johnson, 34 C.M.R. 328, 331 (C.M.A. 1964).   
62.   Boyce, 76 M.J. at 249.   
63.   Id.  
64.   Id. 
65.   Id. 11
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significant doubt about the fairness of the 
proceeding.66 
 In reviewing the legal framework for UCI, several points about 
UCI should be highlighted before considering UCI in the sexual 
assault context. First, the procedural structure strongly favors the 
defense, provided the defense is able to produce “some evidence.”67 
That said, the judge finding apparent UCI has wide latitude to fashion 
an appropriate remedy to eliminate the stain of UCI.68 Dismissal with 
prejudice as a remedy for UCI is only appropriate where “the error 
cannot be rendered harmless.”69 Second, despite the first point, the 
current congressional climate and congressional demands to get tough 
on sexual assault are unlikely to result in a finding of UCI because by 
its terms Article 37 does not apply to members of Congress, only to 
military members (e.g., persons “subject to the code”). In addition, a 
generalized UCI “in the air” will not be considered sufficient evidence 
to establish a claim of UCI.70 Finally, note that the UCI doctrine does 
not address the situation spelled out in the introductory hypothetical, 
where a substantive fact-finder makes decisions, not based on the 
evidence, but based on possible adverse career effects from Congress 
due to an unfavorable outcome. The net effect is an UCI doctrine that 
is very robust as applied to members of the military who engage in 
command influence, but which does not address the two dynamics at 
play in the current political environment. The next section will address 
these dynamics and how they have played out over time.     
III. THE POLITICAL FIGHT OVER REMOVAL OF MILITARY JURISDICTION 
In recent years, the military’s handling of sexual assault cases has 
come under significant scrutiny by Congress. 71  Senator Kirsten 
Gillibrand of New York championed a bill to remove court-martial 
jurisdiction from commanders, particularly due to the military’s 
 
66.   Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
67.   Id.  
68.   United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 416 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
69.   Id.   
70.   United States v. Allen, 33 M.J. 209, 212 (C.M.A. 1991).   
71.   Craig Whitlock & Ed O’Keefe, Female Lawmakers Leading Push to Crack 
Down on Military Sex Crimes, WASHINGTON POST (May 24, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/female-lawmakers-
leading-push-to-crack-down-on-military-sex-crimes/2013/05/24/555848a2-c473-
11e2-97fa-0f57decebbbf_story.html?utm_term=.923d31c74b97.   12
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handling of sexual assault cases.72 This bill narrowly failed.73 Top 
leadership in each of the military services opposed this proposal and 
have acted to crack down on sexual assaults in response.74 Despite the 
failure of the bill to remove jurisdiction, over 100 statutory reforms 
have been enacted since 2012 to address shortcomings in the military 
handling of sexual assault. 75  In addition, the threat to remove 
jurisdiction continues to loom over the military if it continues to have 
problems in prosecuting sexual assault cases.76 
The fight over jurisdiction has caused two fault lines of potential 
problems with command influence which this section will detail: (1) 
commanders facing adverse career consequences from Congress over 
independent decisions made concerning individual courts-martial; 
and (2) military members feeling pressure from their superiors to take 
harsh action in sexual assault cases to preserve commander 
jurisdiction. This section will outline how these specific influences 
have affected individual cases and have set the stage for the more 
recent spike in reversals for UCI.     
A. Congressional Action against Individual Officers 
During the same timeframe as the Gillibrand proposal was being 
considered, controversy erupted over the action of Lieutenant General 
Craig Franklin, commander of the Third Air Force in Europe. He was 
the convening authority reviewing the court-martial conviction of 
Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkerson.77 Colonel Wilkerson served as 
the Inspector General for the Aviano (Italy) Air Base and was alleged 
to have sexually assaulted a house guest while she slept in his family 
 
72. Ed O’Keefe, How Kirsten Gillibrand Won by Losing, WASHINGTON POST 
(Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/03/06/how-kirsten-gillibrand-won-by-
losing/?utm_term=.b1d3580d7726.   
73.   Id. 
74. Craig Whitlock, U.S. Military Chiefs Balk at Taking Sex-Assault Cases out 
of Commanders’ Hands, WASHINGTON POST (June 3, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-military-chiefs-balk-
at-taking-sex-assault-cases-out-of-commanders-hands/2013/06/03/0af4f976-cc85-
11e2-ac03-178510c9cc0a_story.html?utm_term=.0625c174b4bb.   
75.   JPP Report, supra note 6, at 2.     
76.   O’Keefe, supra note 72.   
77.  Robert Draper, The Military’s Rough Justice on Sexual Assault, NEW 
YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Nov. 26, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/magazine/the-militarys-rough-justice-on-
sexual-assault.html.   13
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quarters.78 The military panel found Colonel Wilkerson guilty and 
sentenced him to one year of confinement and a dishonorable 
discharge.79 The case was then sent to Lieutenant General Franklin for 
approval. Upon his review, Lieutenant General Franklin disapproved 
the conviction and dismissed the charges, which drew significant 
congressional ire.80  
Congressional response to Lieutenant General Franklin’s actions 
from members who favored removal of jurisdiction from commanders 
was prompt. In response to Lieutenant General Franklin’s action, 
Senators Barbara Boxer and Jeanne Shaheen, both proponents of 
removal of court-martial jurisdiction, wrote the Secretary of Defense 
Chuck Hagel directly, asking him to review the case. Their letter 
describes Franklin’s action as “unacceptable” and “a travesty of 
justice.”81 They requested that Hagel “immediately provide [them] 
detailed information regarding the basis for General Franklin’s 
decision.”82 
Shortly after the Wilkerson court-martial, Lieutenant General 
Franklin found himself the target of additional criticism because of his 
decision to not refer the court-martial charges against Airman First 
Class Brandon Wright for rape and sexual assault. In this particular 
case, the Article 32 investigating officer as well as his staff judge 
advocate (the senior legal advisor to the convening authority) 
recommended dismissal of the court-martial due to the weakness of 
the evidence. The primary weaknesses in the case were 
inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts of the events and the 
testimony of a third party who was present during the evening in 
question and who testified that the encounter appeared consensual.83  
Notwithstanding these facts, the complainant, through counsel, 
submitted a 12-page memorandum expressing her desire to proceed to 
 
78.   Id. 
79.   Id.  
80.  Craig Whitlock, Air Force General’s Reversal of Pilot’s Sexual-Assault 




d574216d3c8c_story.html?utm_term=.a257e1e7390a.   
81.   Press Release, Boxer, Shaheen Call on Defense Secretary Hagel to 
Immediately Review Dismissal of Sexual Assault Case (Mar. 4, 2013), 
https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/news/press/boxer-shaheen-call-on-defense-
secretary-hagel-to-immediately-review-dismissal-of-sexual-assault-case.   
82.   Id. 
83.   United States v. Wright, 75 M.J. 501, 502 (A.F.C.C.A., 2015) (en banc).   14
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court-martial and requesting an opportunity to meet with Lieutenant 
General Franklin.84 Lieutenant General Franklin declined the request 
to meet and decided against referring charges to court-martial, 
dismissing the case.85 In response, the acting Secretary of the Air 
Force intervened and transferred the case to a different court-martial 
convening authority (who had incidentally previously served on the 
Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services). This 
second convening authority, somewhat unsurprisingly, referred the 
case to general-court martial.86  
Lieutenant General Franklin and his Staff Judge Advocate retired 
shortly thereafter (the Staff Judge Advocate’s retirement was 
involuntary after he was selected for early retirement by a review 
board during the same time frame but purportedly not in connection 
with this case). 87  At trial, the Airman Wright’s defense counsel 
alleged UCI and ultimately the military judge agreed, but found that 
the second convening authority had acted independently and therefore 
the UCI did not prejudice Airman Wright.88 Specifically, the military 
trial judge found that the Air Force Judge Advocate General (the 
highest ranking military lawyer in the Air Force), General Harding, 
telephoned the Staff Judge Advocate in the case, Colonel Bialke, and 
told him that “sexual assault cases, absent ‘smoking gun’ evidence 
about an alleged victim’s credibility, should be sent to court-
martial.”89  
The military judge further ruled that General Harding did so 
because “the failure to have charges preferred against [Airman] 
Wright would enable Senator Kirsten Gillibrand to gain needed votes 
on a pending bill to remove commanders from the court-martial 
process,” which Harding and the Air Force opposed. 90  After 
interlocutory appellate review, the case went to trial. Ultimately 
Airman Wright was acquitted of the charges.91 
 
84.   Id. 
85.   Id.   
86.   Id. at 504. 
87.  Nancy Montgomery, Sexual Assault Case Not Dismissed Despite Ruling of 
Unlawful Command Influence, STARS AND STRIPES (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://www.stripes.com/news/sexual-assault-case-not-dismissed-despite-ruling-
of-unlawful-command-influence-1.362563. 
88.   Id.   
89.   Id. 
90.   Id. 
91.   Nancy Montgomery, Lengthy Sexual Assault Case Ends in Acquittal, 
STARS AND STRIPES (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.stripes.com/news/lengthy-sexual-
assault-case-ends-in-acquittal-1.375792. 15
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Senator McCaskill called for General Franklin to be removed from 
command because of this decision not to refer the Wright case to 
trial.92 Shortly thereafter, the topic of Lieutenant General Franklin 
was discussed at the confirmation hearings of the Secretary of the Air 
Force nominee, Deborah Lee James.93 Shortly after Secretary James 
was confirmed, General Franklin received a phone call from the Chief 
of Staff of the Air Force (the highest ranking officer in the Air Force), 
who informed him that Secretary James had “lost confidence” in him 
and that she would be removing him from command shortly if he did 
not retire.94  
Lieutenant General Franklin submitted a voluntary retirement 
request shortly thereafter, losing a star in the process because he had 
not served sufficient time in the grade of Lieutenant General. 95 
Similarly, in a less-dramatic case, Senator McCaskill blocked the 
nomination of Lieutenant General Susan Helms, who had been 
nominated to serve as the first female Vice Commander of U.S. Space 
Command, because General Helms had overturned a sexual assault 
court-martial conviction in her capacity as convening authority. 96 
These episodes prompted Congress to amend the UCMJ to rescind the 
convening authority’s ability to disapprove findings of guilt in almost 
all cases.97 
B. Military’s “Get Tough” Response to Retain Jurisdiction 
In response to congressional pressure, senior Generals and 
Admirals in each service took strong action to preserve commander 
jurisdiction over the court-martial process in the face of congressional 
criticism.98 They opposed the removal of court-martial jurisdiction 
and acted strongly to press their case that the military could clean up 
 
92.   James Taranto, McCaskill’s Consistently Inconsistent Military Policy, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 3, 2014, at A15.   
93.   See United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 245 (C.A.A.F. 2017). (discussing 
the situation surrounding the retirement of Lieutenant General Franklin). For further 
information regarding this case, see infra notes 142–152 and accompanying text. 
94.   Boyce, 76 M.J. at 245. 
95.   Id. 
96.   Craig Whitlock, General’s Promotion Blocked over Her Dismissal of Sex-
Assault Verdict, WASHINGTON POST (May 6, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/generals-promotion-
blocked-over-her-dismissal-of-sex-assault-verdict/2013/05/06/ef853f8c-b64c-
11e2-bd07-b6e0e6152528_story.html?utm_term=.84d8af42ea5e.   
97.   See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, § 1702, Pub. 
L. 113-66, 127 Stat. 955 (2013) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 860 (2012)) 
98.   Whitlock, supra note 58. 16
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its act and properly prosecute sexual assaults.99 This response has also 
created the potential for a climate that fosters actual unlawful 
command influence. This logic is reflected in the military judge’s 
finding that the Air Force Judge Advocate General engaged in UCI in 
the Airman Wright case discussed in the previous section: “[Failure 
to prosecute Airman Wright] would enable Senator Kirsten Gillibrand 
to gain needed votes on a pending bill to remove commanders from 
the court-martial process.” 100  Any military person responsible for 
making substantive decisions on case disposition or on guilt and 
sentence will be faced with the temptation to take this logic into 
account—particularly the higher-ranking individuals who are more 
acutely aware of the stakes of potential loss of commander 
jurisdiction.  
In addition, the Secretary of Defense withheld jurisdiction over 
initial disposition of sexual assaults to the Special Court-Martial 
Convening Authority in the grade of 0-6 (colonel or Navy captain) or 
higher.101 These commanders will normally have nearly 30 years of 
service and those selected for command at this level are considered to 
be the top prospects for future promotion to General or Admiral.102 
Such individuals are going to be acutely aware of the political stakes 
involved in their decisions (and the potential ramifications to their 
own military careers if they make an unpopular decision). In such 
instances, the temptation is great for a commander to decide a case 
based on political considerations instead of the evidence.     
Concerns about retaining commander jurisdiction also infected the 
high profile court-martial of Brigadier General Jeffrey A. Sinclair for 
 
99.   Id.  
100.  Montgomery, supra note71.   
101.  Secretary of Defense, Withholding Initial Disposition Authority Under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice in Certain Sexual Assault Cases, JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS PANEL (Apr. 20, 2012), http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_Topic-
Areas/09-
Withholding_Authority/20160408/01_SecDef_Memo_WithholdingAuthority_201
20420.pdf.   
102.  See Lt. Col. (Ret.) Paul Edgar, Some Thoughts on How to Improve the 
Selection of Brigade Commanders, FOREIGN POLICY BEST DEFENSE (Oct. 13, 2014), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/13/some-thoughts-on-how-to-improve-the-
selection-of-brigade-commanders/, (noting that “brigade command is the earnest 
gateway to general officer and executive national leadership”); James Dao, Panetta 
Proposes New Sexual Assault Rules for the Military, NEW YORK TIMES AT WAR 
(Apr. 17, 2012), https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/panetta-proposes-
new-sexual-assault-rules-for-the-military/ (noting that Colonels (or Navy Captains) 
are “more experienced” and “better equipped” to properly make decisions on a 
sexual assault case). 17
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sexual assault.103 In this case, the Army prosecuted an active duty 
General Officer for sexually assaulting his aide, a female Captain who 
was responsible for managing his daily responsibilities and with 
whom he had carried on a consensual affair.104 The defense raised an 
UCI motion, alleging that UCI infected the decision to reject a defense 
offer to plead guilty, which is the process by which a plea bargain is 
reached in a court-martial. 105  The defense offer to plead was 
submitted to the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, a three-star 
general, for a decision whether to accept the proposed plea 
agreement.106  
Based on legal requirements, the complainant was afforded an 
opportunity to be heard on whether the Corps Commander should 
approve the offer. 107  The complainant, through her special victim 
counsel, Captain Cassie Fowler, submitted a letter opposing the 
proposed agreement. 108  In this letter, Captain Fowler stated: 
“Allowing the accused to characterize this relationship as a 
consensual affair would only strengthen the arguments of those 
individuals that believe the prosecution of sexual assault should be 
taken away from the Army.”109  
The military judge ruled that this letter constituted “unlawful 
command influence” because it invoked the military senior 
leadership’s position on whether the military should retain court-
martial jurisdiction as a reason to reject the proposed plea deal. The 
Corps Commander disapproved the proposed plea agreement in part 
because of this letter.110 As a result, the military judge ordered that the 
case be transferred to a different commander for action on the 
proposed plea deal.111     
The Sinclair episode is like the “he-who-shall-not-be-named” rule 
found in the Harry Potter novels. In those novels, characters avoided 
using the name of the lead villain, Lord Voldemort, out of fear that he 
 
103.  Alan Blinder & Richard A. Oppel Jr., How a Military Sexual Assault Case 
Foundered, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 12, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/us/how-a-military-sexual-assault-case-
foundered.html. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id.   
106.  Id. (the article identifies the commander as Lieutenant General Joseph 
Anderson).   
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would thereby gain more power. In the same way, commanders 
making decisions on sexual assault courts-martial are certainly aware 
of their leadership’s concern over losing jurisdiction. It is hard to 
imagine that this consideration does not cross their minds when 
making decisions in such cases.  
However, the moment such reasoning is explicitly stated or 
adopted, it becomes UCI. As a result, this consideration lurks below 
the surface, influencing substantive decisions. Judges and defense 
counsel will have difficulty determining the degree to which it 
influences decisions because the premise remains unstated. Captain 
Fowler’s mistake was stating the argument directly in her letter to the 
Corps Commander. This episode raises the obvious question—do 
such considerations reach all the way into the panel deliberation room, 
where actual decisions on guilt, innocence and punishment are made? 
A recent court-martial suggests that it has reached this far.112   
In United States v. Schloff, the accused was convicted of abusive 
sexual contact for the inappropriate touching of a female 
soldier/patient.113 Subsequent to the case, one of the panel members 
submitted a sworn statement asserting that political discussions had 
invaded the deliberations.114 The matter was submitted for a post-trial 
fact-finding hearing and the military judge ruled that the two senior 
officers on the panel in fact had discussed the political climate during 
deliberations: 
At the beginning of deliberations on findings of 
appellant’s court-martial, the president and senior 
ranking member of the panel, [Col JW], made a 
statement to the effect that based on the political 
climate, the Army could not seem weak or soft in 
dealing with sexual harassment or assault. He also 
asked a question to the effect of, “How does the Chief 
of Staff of the Army’s current emphasis on sexual 
harassment affect the findings and our decision in this 
matter?” [Col AM] made some unspecified or similar 
 
112. United States v. Schloff, ARMY 20150724 (A. Ct. Crim. App., Feb. 5, 
2018) (summary disposition), http://www.caaflog.com/wp-content/uploads/sd-
schloff-cs.pdf.   
113.  Id. at 1. 
114.  Id. at 2–3.  19
Visger: The Canary in the Military Justice Mineshaft: A Review of Recent
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
78 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [41 
comments or comments indicating agreement with 
[Col JW].115 
The Army Court of Appeals had no trouble ruling that this 
discussion constituted UCI and reversed the conviction. 116  In this 
particular case, these comments came to light only because one of the 
panel members had the courage to submit an affidavit implicating two 
superior officers in inappropriate behavior.117 A case such as Schloff 
in this political climate might cause a reasonable outside observer of 
all military sexual assault prosecutions to “harbor a significant doubt 
about the fairness of the proceeding[s],”118 thus triggering apparent 
UCI.     
One significant aspect of the military campaign to preserve 
jurisdiction is the fine line between offering military advice on the 
prospect of removing court-martial jurisdiction and engaging in an 
active campaign to oppose the removal of court-martial jurisdiction. 
Once the military took a position and actively campaigned to preserve 
jurisdiction, the message invariably seeped down the lower ranks that 
the military needed to “get tough” on sexual assault. The best example 
of this reasoning was a series of briefs given in 2012 by General James 
Amos, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, colloquially entitled 
the “Heritage Brief.” 119  Dwight Sullivan describes the message 
General Amos gave at Parris Island—similar to one he delivered to 
every  officer and senior non-commissioned officer in the Marine 
Corps:   
In his Heritage Brief delivered at Parris Island, the 
Commandant told the officers and staff NCOs in his 
audience that he had just met with five members of 
Congress at breakfast at his home and two of them 
walked out, saying they didn’t trust the Marine Corps 
to fix its sexual assault problem. The Commandant 
mentioned five bills pending in Congress, one of 
 
115.  Id. at 2 (alterations in original).   
116.  Id. at 5. 
117.  Id. at 2.   
118.  United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 249 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).   
119.  Dwight Sullivan, Top 10 military justice stories of 2012 — #1 The 
politicization of the military’s response to sexual assaults, CAAFLOG (Jan. 1, 
2013), http://www.caaflog.com/2013/01/01/top-10-military-justice-stories-of-
2012-1-the-politicization-of-the-militarys-response-to-sexual-assaults/#more-
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which would completely remove convening 
authorities from the sexual assault referral process 
because Congress has “no confidence” in the Marine 
Corps’ “ability or willingness to do anything about” 
sexual assaults itself. He said the bill would take 
control from Marine Corps commanders and give it to 
the Department of Justice. He told his audience that 
he assured one of the members of Congress at his 
home: “I am the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
and I am telling you we are going to fix it. I’m sick of 
it; we’re fixing it.”120   
General Amos then went on to state in the briefing that 80 percent 
of sexual assault allegations were “legitimate.”121 With messages like 
this being sent by the top commander of the Marine Corps, and likely 
similar ones from the other military branches, it is not surprising to 
see substantive decisions in individual cases affected by a concern to 
preserve commander jurisdiction. There is a role for the military to 
engage with Congress to respond to criticisms on the military’s 
handling of sexual assault cases and offer its advice as to whether 
removal of jurisdiction from commanders is advisable. But when 
military leadership goes beyond these roles and engages in an active 
campaign to preserve commander jurisdiction, it is unsurprising to see 
outcomes like the Schloff case.   
IV. EFFECTS ON THE MILITARY JUSTICE PROCESS 
A. JPP Report 
As part of the ongoing concern over the military handling of 
sexual assault cases, Congress directed the Department of Defense to 
report on the effect of recent changes and the handling of sexual 
assault cases.122  This requirement led the Secretary of Defense to 
establish the Subcommittee to the Judicial Proceedings Panel, which 
issued its most recent report on May 12, 2017.123  The report found 
that many of the congressionally directed changes had been 
“valuable” and that there appeared to be increased “confidence that 
 
120.  Id.   
121.  Id.  
122.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 § 576, Pub. L. 
112-239, 126 Stat. 1632 (2013). 
123.  JPP Report, supra note 6, at 2. 21
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the criminal justice system will help the victim and vigorously 
prosecute the accused.”124 However, the committee noted that it had 
been “repeatedly told on its site visits” that the reforms “raised serious 
questions about the fundamental fairness of the military justice 
process when it comes to the treatment of the accused.”125   
One of the issues identified by the JPP Report was that almost 
every sexual assault was referred to court-martial for trial regardless 
of merit. 126  One contributing factor to this phenomenon that the 
Subcommittee identified is the low standard for referral, which at the 
time was “reasonable grounds” under Rule for Courts-Martial 601127 
(although the standard was recently changed to probable cause128). In 
addition, the rule specifies that the reasonable grounds finding can 
rely on “hearsay in whole or in part” and that the convening authority 
“may consider information from any source” in rendering her 
decision.129 The JPP Report noted that this standard was significantly 
lower than that in the civilian sector and the ABA’s Criminal Justice 
Standards. 130  The panel noted that the ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards for Prosecution limits prosecutions to situations where 
“admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond 
a reasonable doubt and [when] the decision to charge is in the interest 
of justice.” 131  Similarly, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual limits 
prosecutions to situations where “admissible evidence will probably 
be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.”132 The Report also 
noted that Congress had amended the UCMJ to require the Secretary 
of Defense to issue nonbinding guidance for disposition of cases 
which, when published, might help ameliorate this situation and 
introduce a standard similar to the ABA and U.S. Attorneys’ 
 
124.  Id. at Executive Summary. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. at 12.   
127.  Id. at 10.   
128.  See Exec. Order No. 13825, annex 2, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 1, 2018) 
(amending R.C.M. 601(d)(1)). In addition, this new standard requires a written 
determination of probable cause by the convening authority’s senior legal advisor 
prior to referral. Id. This new requirement may address some of the concerns raised 
by the Subcommittee in this regard.     
129.  MCM, supra note 46, R.C.M. 601(d)(1).   
130.  JPP Report, supra note 6, at 10.   
131. Id. (quoting CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION, Standard 3-4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 4th ed. 2015)).  
132.  Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL, Section 9-27.220 (1997, updated Jan. 2017)).   22
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standards.133 This guidance has been subsequently published in the 
2019 Manual for Courts-Martial, taking effect on January 1, 2019.134   
However, even if the standards and guidance for referral are 
modified, the JPP Report also found that there was substantial 
pressure to refer all sexual assault cases to trial.135 This is unsurprising 
in light of the Lieutenant General Franklin incident discussed earlier, 
where his decision not to refer a sexual assault case to court-martial 
contributed to his early retirement at a lower rank. Specifically, the 
Report noted: 
Judge advocates overwhelmingly reported a 
perception of pressure on convening authorities to 
refer sexual assault cases to court-martial, regardless 
of merit. According to many of the judge advocates 
interviewed on site visits, this pressure extends to weak 
cases that civilian jurisdictions would not prosecute, 
and in some cases, have already declined to prosecute. 
The vast majority of prosecutors and defense counsel 
who spoke with the Subcommittee have the impression 
that this pressure causes convening authorities to favor 
referral to court-martial rather than deal with the 
potential adverse ramifications of not referring a 
sexual assault case, such as career setbacks, media 
scrutiny, the possibility of their non-referral decisions 
being subjected to elevated review, or questions about 
why a case was not referred.136   
Another commander who was interviewed by the panel indicated 
that “he forwards every sexual assault case to the next general officer 
in the chain of command” and that “he felt the need to ‘do something 
immediately’ or face harm to his career.”137 The JPP found that there 
were multiple repercussions from referring every case to court-
martial. These include: (1) high acquittal rate; (2) diversion of 
prosecution resources away from “more serious and well-supported 
allegations”; (3) prosecutors finding themselves in an “ethical 
quandary” by trying cases “with no reasonable likelihood of 
 
133.  Id. at 14. This guidance was recently issued in the new Manual for Courts-
Martial.   
134.  MCM, supra note 46, app. 2.1. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id.  
137.  Id. 23
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conviction”; (4) low conviction rate causing discredit to the entire 
military justice system; (5) an increase in processing times “as more 
cases flood the system;” and (6) “[w]hen weak cases linger in the 
system pending trial, the accused’s and victim’s careers and lives 
remain on hold until the case is resolved.”138 
This report suggests that a climate of UCI exists concerning 
decisions to refer cases to court-martial. Commanders are making 
disposition decisions not based on the legal merits of a case, but 
instead on how the commander perceives Congress or their chain of 
command will react. The prospect of politically-motivated referrals to 
trial is then made worse by comments such as General Amos’ 
statements that eighty percent of the complaints are legitimate—
which could be interpreted as a directive to convict in eighty percent 
of cases. 139  While the recently-published disposition guidance 
specifically prohibits consideration of career or political 
considerations in making referral decisions,140 the guidance is by its 
terms “non-binding” and not intended to create an enforceable right 
by an accused.141  A review of recent cases decided by the military 
appellate courts, particularly the civilian Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, indicates that the corrosive effects of UCI are in fact 
affecting the integrity of the court-martial process as well.   
B. Recent CAAF Cases Reversing due to UCI 
The recent cases decided by CAAF reversing sexual assault cases 
for UCI appear to be a culmination of the foregoing political and legal 
struggles. As noted earlier in Schloff and the account of the Sinclair 
court-martial, political pressures contributed to UCI in those cases 
even affected the panel’s internal deliberations on guilt in the Schloff 
case. This section will detail four additional cases that have been 
decided in a relatively narrow timeframe, all involving CAAF 
reversals of sexual assault convictions. These cases indicate that the 
Schloff and Sinclair cases may not be isolated and there might be a 
larger problem.   
 
138.  Id. at 21.   
139.  See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.   
140.  MCM, supra note 46, at app. 2.1, para. 2-7. 
141.  Id. at para. 1.4. 24
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1. United States v. Boyce  
This case provides a demonstration of how congressional 
involvement in particular cases can undermine the validity of 
subsequent cases. Boyce involves a familiar figure, Lieutenant 
General Craig Franklin, discussed earlier in this article, who was 
forced to retire early at a loss of rank after his run-in with Congress 
over his disapproval of Lieutenant Colonel Wilkerson’s sexual assault 
conviction and General Franklin’s decision to not refer Airman 
Wright’s case to a court-martial and dismiss the charges.142 Shortly 
after he submitted his retirement request, yet another sexual assault 
case came to General Franklin for decision, and General Franklin 
elected to refer these sexual assault charges against Airman Boyce to 
general court-martial. 143  Not surprisingly, the defense moved to 
dismiss the case, alleging unlawful command influence on General 
Franklin’s decision to refer Airman Boyce’s charges to court-martial 
(which, as discussed earlier, is a quasi-judicial act).144   
After Airman Boyce was convicted, the CAAF, in a 3-2 decision, 
reversed on appeal for apparent UCI.145 The court noted that there was 
no actual UCI, as the case against Boyce was strong and there were 
no outside attempts to influence General Franklin’s decision to refer 
in this particular case.146 However, the court found apparent UCI, 
detailing a chronology that drew a direct link between congressional 
action and subsequent actions by the Secretary of the Air Force and 
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.147 The court detailed a timeline of 
events which constituted apparent UCI: 
- Prior to the confirmation of Deborah Lee James as 
Secretary of the Air Force, a key member of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee who would later vote on 
her nomination commented on Lt Gen Franklin's 
decision to set aside the findings and sentence in 
the Wilkerson case. The senator specifically stated that 
commanders needed to be held ‘accountable’ for their 
handling of sexual assault charges. 
 
142.  76 M.J. 242, 245-56 (C.A.A.F. 2017). 
143.  Id. at 246. 
144.  Id.  
145.  Id. at 244. 
146.  Id. at 250. 
147.  Id. at 251-52. 25
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- Ms. James subsequently was confirmed by the 
Senate, and on December 20, 2013, she was sworn in 
as Secretary of the Air Force. 
- On December 23, 2013, Lt Gen Franklin read what 
he described as an article in which one of the senators 
on the Senate Armed Services Committee indicated 
that he was scheduled to retire in the near future. 
- On December 27, 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force telephoned Lt Gen Franklin and informed him 
that the new Secretary had “lost confidence” in him 
and that he had two options: voluntarily retire from the 
Air Force at the lower grade of major general, or wait 
for the Secretary to remove him from his command in 
the immediate future. 
- Three hours after this call, Lt Gen Franklin decided 
to retire. Because Lt Gen Franklin did not have the 
requisite time in his highest pay grade, this retirement 
carried with it a loss of rank and a concomitant loss of 
retirement pay. 
- In his written retirement request, Lt Gen Franklin 
acknowledged the following: “My decisions as a 
[GCMCA] have come under great public scrutiny," 
and "media attention ... will likely occur on subsequent 
sexual assault cases I deal with.” 
- On the same day that Lt Gen Franklin was contacted by the 
Chief of Staff, he received the referral package regarding 
Appellant's case. On January 6, 2014, Lt Gen Franklin referred 
Appellant's case, which included sexual assault charges, to a 
general court-martial. Thus, Appellant's case qualified as a 
“subsequent sexual assault case[ ]” that Lt Gen Franklin had 
expressed concern about due to the likelihood of “media 
attention” and “great public scrutiny.”148 
The majority found “the totality of the circumstances in this case 
to be particularly troubling and egregious.”149 The court further stated 
 
148.  Id. (alterations in original).  
149.  Id. at 252.  26
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that “[s]pecifically [the Court] conclude[s] that members of the public 
would understandably question whether the conduct of the Secretary 
of the Air Force and/or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force improperly 
inhibited [General] Franklin from exercising his court-martial 
convening authority in a truly independent and impartial manner as is 
required to ensure the integrity of the referral process.”150 
This ruling is breathtaking in its potential implications. One could 
readily argue that it calls into question every Air Force sexual assault 
case referred to court-martial subsequent to the Franklin incident. It is 
impossible not to imagine that every convening authority in the Air 
Force “got the message” after General Franklin’s retirement 
announcement and would refer every case to trial to avoid the same 
negative career implications. In fact, the JPP Report indicates that this 
scenario is exactly what is happening. 151  The court, however, 
downplayed this possibility: 
In reaching our holding in this case, we fully 
acknowledge that we do not have the authority to 
redress the chilling effect that the conduct of the 
Secretary of the Air Force and/or the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force generally may have had on other 
convening authorities and in other criminal cases that 
are not before us. We recognize that such systemic 
problems must be left to Congress and the executive to 
address. Nonetheless, in individual cases that are 
properly presented to this Court—such as Appellant's—
we will remain ever mindful of Chief Judge Everett's 
admonition that unlawful command influence is the 
“mortal enemy of military justice,” and we will meet 
our responsibility to serve as a “bulwark” against it by 
taking all appropriate steps within our power to 
counteract its malignant effects.152  
This dictum suggests that we should expect CAAF to engage in 
close examination for UCI during their appellate review and 
aggressively act to curt ail it. 
 
150.  Id. at 252-53.   
151.  See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.  
152.  Id. at 253. 27
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2. United States v. Riesbeck   
In U.S. v. Riesbeck, the CAAF reversed a forcible rape conviction 
arising out of the Coast Guard and dismissed the case with prejudice 
due to egregious “court stacking” (e.g., selecting individual panel 
members to achieve a particular outcome—a finding of guilty), which 
is a form of UCI.153 The CAAF was particularly concerned that the 
seven-person court-martial panel was comprised of five women, four 
of whom had been trained as victim advocates.154 A victim advocate 
is a command-nominated individual who undergoes special training 
and certification to provide assistance to victims of sexual assault.155 
Article 25 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires a 
convening authority to select “best-qualified” panel members in 
accordance with specified criteria.156 Gender is not one of the Article 
25 criteria and because only 15-20 percent of the pool of potential 
panel members were women, the military judge at the post-trial 
hearing found that the convening authority “most likely” intentionally 
selected a large number of women “given the intense external 
pressures” the military was facing regarding sexual assault cases.157 
The CAAF, agreeing with this assessment, concluded the panel 
selection resulted from a misguided (in the opinion of CAAF) belief 
that women are more likely than men to convict in sexual assault cases 
and stated the result “smacks of a panel that was ‘hand-picked’ by or 
for the [prosecution].”158   
However, the CAAF was even more troubled by the failure of the 
lower courts (which consist of military attorneys as the presiding 
judges) to protect the integrity of the court-martial process.159 The 
CAAF noted that when the defense objected to the panel, the trial 
court judge “blithely assert[ed] that the issues could be worked out on 
appeal.”160 Meanwhile, the lower appellate court, the Coast Guard 
Court of Criminal Appeals (CGCCA), affirmed the conviction 
twice—once on direct appeal and a second time after CAAF sent the 
 
153.  77 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2018). 
154.  Id. at 158. 
155 . U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M1754.10E, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND 
RESPONSE (SAPR) PROGRAM, chapter 1(O) (2016).   
156.  UCMJ, art. 25, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2012). 
157.  Riesbeck, 77 M.J. at 160-161.   
158.  Id. at 166 (alterations in original).   
159.  Id. at 167. 
160.  Id. at 159 (alterations in original). 28
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case back for a post-trial hearing on the court-stacking issue.161 The 
CAAF, clearly frustrated by these continual failings, dismissed the 
lower courts’ reasoning as “pure sophistry”162 and “absurdity”163 and 
a “stain on the military justice system.” 164  In an extraordinary 
conclusion, the CAAF openly scolded all involved in the process, 
stating: “[D]ue to the patent and intolerable efforts to manipulate the 
member selection process, contra every requirement of the law, the 
failures of the military judge, the [post-trial hearing] military judge, 
and the CGCCA, to investigate, recognize or ameliorate the clear 
court stacking in this case, and the actual prejudice to the Appellant 
of being tried by a panel cherry-picked for the Government, dismissal 
with prejudice is the only remedy that can ‘eradicate the unlawful 
command influence and ensure the public perception of fairness in the 
military justice system.’”165   
3. United States v. Commisso166  
In Commisso, the CAAF reversed another sexual assault 
conviction, this time for dishonest answers given by panel members 
during voir dire. 167  While not directly implicating UCI, the court 
invoked the legal doctrine of “implied bias” where a member can be 
challenged for cause and should not sit on the court-martial “in the 
interest of having the court-martial free from substantial doubt as to 
legality fairness, and impartiality.”168 While this case does not directly 
discuss UCI, the doctrine of implied bias is very similar to apparent 
UCI in its focus on appearance of fairness. This case contains many 
similar dynamics as those found in the other cases discussed in this 
article are also present. In this case, three of the ten panel members 
who heard Commisso’s case regularly sat on a monthly Sexual 
Assault Review Board (SARB), during which each pending sexual 
assault case was discussed, and during which a slide with the facts of 
each case as alleged by the complainant is shown.169 Despite this fact, 
these three members answered in the negative to the following 
questions posed by the defense counsel: “Does anyone have any prior 
 
161.  Id. at 160-162. 
162.  Id. at 162. 
163.  Id. at 163. 
164.  Id. at 159 n.6.  
165.  Id. at 167 (internal citations omitted).   
166.  76 M.J. 315 (C.A.A.F. 2017). 
167.  Id. at 317–318.   
168.  Id. at 321, 323 (citing R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N)). 
169.  Id. at 317–18. 29
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knowledge of the facts or events alleged in this case?”; “Has anyone 
heard about any of the facts of this case whatsoever?”; “Are you, a 
member of your family, or close friend a member of a group or charity 
that deals with issues of sexual assault [either] in [the] military or in 
general?” and “Have you ever been a unit victim advocate, a sexual 
assault response coordinator, or otherwise involved in [the] sexual 
assault response system?”170 During the course of the trial, one of the 
panel members determined that he did have knowledge of the case 
from his prior involvement in the SARB.171 He discussed the matter 
with the other two panel members who also sat on the SARB, but did 
not disclose the matter to the military judge.172 The matter was not 
discovered until one of the panel members disclosed the fact after the 
trial had concluded.173 During the post-trial hearing, one of the panel 
members testified that he was concerned about “aggressive” defense 
counsel questioning on voir dire and stated “sometimes when he is 
sitting on panels he wants to jump over the bar and punch the [defense 
attorney].”174  After chastising the members in question 175  and the 
military judge176 for failing to sufficiently develop the record during 
the post-trial hearing, the court reversed the conviction, stating that 
these facts “might have cast substantial doubt as to the legality, 
fairness and impartiality of Appellant’s court-martial, . . . , and thus 
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”177   
4. United States v. Barry178  
Most recently, on September 5, 2018, the CAAF reversed another 
court-martial conviction for sexual assault and dismissed the case with 
prejudice due to unlawful command influence by the Navy’s Deputy 
Judge Advocate General, the second highest ranking Navy JAG Corps 
officer (and who was subsequently promoted to Judge Advocate 
General).179 Senior Chief Barry was convicted of sexual assault of his 
then-girlfriend based on her allegation of nonconsensual anal sex.180 
 
170.  Id. at 319 (brackets in original). 
171.  Id.  
172.  Id. at 320. 
173.  Id. at 319. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. at 322–23. 
176.  Id. at 323–24. 
177.  Id. at 324 (internal quotations marks, brackets and citation omitted). 
178.  78 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2018). 
179.  Id. at 75.     
180.  Id. at 73.  30
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The allegations of UCI centered on the decision of the convening 
authority to approve the findings and sentence. As Congress has 
removed this authority from convening authorities subsequent to the 
Lieutenant Colonel Wilkerson case, the exercise of this particular 
authority is no longer an issue.181   
Despite this fact, the contours of command influence from the 
highest levels became apparent yet again. The convening authority, 
Rear Admiral Patrick Lorge, spent over two and a half months closely 
reviewing the record of trial and harbored strong doubts about whether 
Senior Chief Barry was in fact guilty.182 Admiral Lorge was generally 
aware of the pressures on the Navy in regards to sexual assault and 
had met with the then-sitting Judge Advocate General (Admiral 
DeRenzi), who discussed the pressures she faced in her position with 
regard to sexual assault.183 In addition, Admiral Lorge’s senior legal 
advisor “strongly, and on multiple occasions” advised Admiral Lorge 
to approve the findings and sentence, reminding him of “the political 
pressures on the system.”184  Unsure of what to do, he sought the 
counsel of Rear Admiral James Crawford, with whom he had worked 
in a previous assignment and who was then serving as the Deputy 
Judge Advocate General.185 Admiral Crawford told Admiral Lorge 
that he “had smart lawyers so he should let them figure it out.”186 
Admiral Crawford then said words to the effect of “not to put a target 
on [your] back,” implying that failing to approve the finding of guilty 
and the sentence would put a target on Admiral Lorge’s back.187 
Admiral Lorge ultimately approved the conviction and sentence, but 
included an “unusual” caveat in which he stated that “I have never 
reviewed a case that has given me greater pause” and urged the 
appellate courts to overturn the case (something that was then within 
Admiral Lorge’s power to accomplish when he wrote this caveat).188 
The CAAF unanimously ruled that Senior Chief Barry’s 
conviction should be overturned but disagreed as to the legal rationale. 
The majority opinion, in a 3-2 vote, ruled that Admiral Crawford’s 
action constituted UCI and served as a basis to dismiss with 
 
181.  See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.  
182.  Barry, 78 M.J. at 74.   
183.  Id. at 74–75. The court noted, however, that this meeting did not constitute 
UCI. Id.    
184.  Id. at 75.   
185.  Id.  
186.  Id.  
187.  Id.  
188.  Id. at 73. 31
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prejudice.189 While this case was unusual in that the perpetrator of 
UCI, Admiral Crawford, did not exercise the mantle of command 
authority, the court determined that anyone subject to the UCMJ could 
engage in UCI. 190  Specifically, based on these conversations, 
“[Admiral] Lorge believed harm would befall the Navy if he did not 
fall in line.” 191  As a result, “[Admiral] Lorge would have taken 
different action in the case.”192 Noting that Admiral Lorge believed 
that the prosecution had failed to establish Senior Chief Barry’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the court determined that dismissal with 
prejudice was the only remedy that “will provide meaningful 
relief.”193 
While the court was careful to note that any UCI on the part of 
Admiral Crawford was “unintentional,”194 the prospective impact of 
this case is substantial. The case demonstrates that the political 
pressures of the military’s sexual assault situation has invaded the 
highest levels of the U.S. Navy’s JAG Corps. This suggests that the 
same political pressures to protect commander jurisdiction being felt 
by military leaders is also being felt by their attorneys. Previous 
reforms to the military justice system sought to inject attorneys into 
the process to serve as guardians of the system, to promote due process 
and minimize the potential of command abuses. Now, even the 
military attorneys are being influenced by these political pressures.   
C. Emerging Themes from Recent Cases: 
The number of reversals, implicating basic concerns about 
fundamental fairness and coming over a relatively small period of 
time, has to be concerning. Two additional themes seem to be 
emerging, neither of which are positive:   
(1) Some of the highest-ranking officials in the various services 
are being implicated for UCI. In the cases reviewed above, 
many of the top leaders in the various services, to include the 
 
189.  Id. at 72, 80. The dissent, on the other hand, believed that this erroneous 
action should be returned to the convening authority with a directive to disapprove 
the finding of guilty pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial 1107(g). Id. at 72, 88–89 
(Ryan, J., dissenting).    
190.  Id. at 76–77.   
191.  Id. at 78.  
192.  Id.   
193.  Id. at 79 & nn.9, 15.   
194.  Id. at 78. Despite this fact, the court noted that Admiral Crawford was not 
statutorily authorized to give legal advice to Admiral Lorge. Id. at 77 n.6.   32
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top military lawyers, have been implicated in UCI. In the cases 
detailed above, the activities of the Secretary of the Air Force 
(Boyce), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Boyce), the Air 
Force Judge Advocate General (Boyce), the Navy Judge 
Advocate General (Barry), and the Navy Deputy Judge 
Advocate General (Barry) have been called into question or 
actually ruled to constitute UCI. In the General Sinclair court-
martial noted earlier, Brigadier General Paul Wilson, a high 
ranking Army JAG general, was separately found to have 
committed UCI.195 In the case of the Heritage Brief given by 
the former Commandant of the Marine Corps, claims of UCI 
required extensive litigation.196    
 
(2) The CAAF appears to be increasingly frustrated by the failure 
of lower courts and military attorneys to police the system. 
This frustration led to strong language in Riesbeck, which is 
harshly critical of the two appellate decisions and the two trial-
level military judges who heard that matter. The court 
dismissed the lower courts’ reasoning as “pure sophistry” in a 
ruling that had to send shock waves among the trial judges and 
the military courts of appeal.197 Similarly, CAAF was critical 
of the military judge conducting the post-trial hearing in 
Commisso. One particular deficiency that the court noted was 
the fact that the military judge did not ask the critical and 
seemingly obvious question of why the three panel members 
failed to notify the judge once they realized that they in fact 
had outside knowledge of the case (noting that panel members 
have a continuing obligation to inform the military judge 
before the close of trial if he or she realizes that the answers 
provided during voir dire were incorrect).198 The CAAF called 
this failure to inquire an “egregious oversight” on the part of 
the military judge.199 Given the answers that had been adduced 
to that point from one of the panel members, which were 
 
195.  Blinder & Oppel, supra note 104.   
196. Michael Doyle, Tough Talk by Marine Commandant James Amos 
Complicates Sexual-Assault Cases, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Sept. 13, 2012), 
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-
security/article24736978.html.    
197.  Riesbeck, 77 M.J. at 162. 
198.  Commisso, 76 M.J. at 323–24. 
199.  Id. at 324.   33
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strongly critical of defense counsel generally, one might 
speculate that the military judge avoided the question in an 
attempt to salvage the court-martial conviction (instead of 
developing the facts fairly and impartially).   
This second development could be especially troubling if it 
reflects a larger trend. Military judges were just recently afforded 
tenure by statute, 200  which should afford a heightened level of 
independence. However, military judges, both trial and appellate, are 
senior military officers selected and certified by their respective Judge 
Advocate General. 201  As noted in the previous paragraph, senior 
military attorneys, including the Judge Advocates General of two 
military services, have been implicated in UCI. While judges’ 
decisions are protected by the same UCI doctrines discussed in this 
article, these individuals face the same pressures. To be clear, there 
are no documented instances of any judge—trial or appellate—being 
affected by UCI in sexual assault cases. It appears in the Riesbeck and 
Commisso decisions that the CAAF is concerned that military judges 
also are being influenced by these considerations. The CAAF’s harsh 
language perhaps recognizes these dangers and seeks to prevent it.   
V. POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM 
The cases noted in this article suggest that the military has over-
corrected in its endeavor to maintain commander jurisdiction. When 
a driver is skidding on icy or wet roads, the worst thing the driver can 
do is to turn the steering wheel in the opposite direction from which 
the driver is skidding—this will only make the skid worse and cause 
the driver to lose control. Instead, one “steers into the skid” in order 
to re-gain control and then, once control is re-gained, steer the vehicle 
in the proper direction. By engaging in a get-tough campaign in order 
to preserve commander jurisdiction, the military has similarly over-
corrected and is threatening to skid out of control. If Congress 
determines that, based on these CAAF decisions, the military has gone 
too far in attempting to get tough on sexual assault, Congress may 
very well decide to remove commander jurisdiction—but for very 
different reasons than their original concerns.   
 
200.  See Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5184, 130 Stat. 
2000 (2016) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 826) (requiring that assignments for military 
judges “shall be for appropriate minimum periods”).     
201.  See 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (2012) (requiring a military judge to be designated 
by the Judge Advocate General or his designee). 34
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Because of the problems noted in this article, Congress and the 
military should work together to consider further reforms to excise the 
UCI that has begun to become evident. In its April 1950 article, Can 
Military Trials Be Fair?, the Stanford Law Review raised similar 
concerns about whether the newly-passed protections in the UCMJ 
could stem command influence, but at the same time recognized that 
removal of jurisdiction was not advisable. 202  Instead, the article 
suggested two possible alternatives to limit command influence 
modeled on other countries’ military justice systems at that time.203 
This juncture may be an appropriate time to consider these proposed 
reforms. The two proposals offered by the Stanford Law Review 
article, along with a long-standing proposal for reforming the panel 
member selection process, offer three possibilities to address these 
concerns and improve fairness short of the drastic remedy of removing 
commander jurisdiction altogether. 
A. Remove Convening Authority Selection of Panel Members  
This proposed reform has been debated since the adoption of the 
UCMJ and many proponents argued for its inclusion into the 
UCMJ.204 Indeed, the proposition that the Commanding General who 
refers a case to court-martial for prosecution also personally selects 
the members from among her subordinates who will decide upon guilt 
and adjudge a sentence is unsettling at first glance. As was argued 
during the debates leading up to the adoption of the UCMJ, this is akin 
to having a criminal jury selected by the sheriff’s office or district 
attorney.205   
This debate goes to the heart of what it means for commanders to 
be able to use the military justice system to effectuate discipline and, 
thereby, an effective fighting force. Proponents of reform argue that 
this practice creates too great a risk of command influence and, at a 
minimum, creates the appearance of impropriety. 206  In fact, the 
Canadian and British systems have abandoned this practice after 
courts ruled that the practice violated fundamental human rights 
 
202.  Can Military Trials Be Fair?, supra note 57, at 552–53.   
203.  Id. 
204.  See generally Behan, supra note 54. 
205.  GENEROUS, supra note 28, at 45–46.  
206.  Id. 35
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requirements for fair trials. 207  On the other hand, defenders of 
convening authority selection of panel members argue that this 
practice is operationally necessary in order to maintain discipline in a 
deployed environment and the practice is central to the principle of 
the commander’s responsibility to maintain discipline.208 In light of 
renewed concerns about unlawful command influence in sexual 
assault trials, it may be time to reconsider this practice.   
Consider a recent court-martial that took place at West Point 
Military Academy, where the author is currently assigned. After a trial 
that ran from May 1–4, 2017, Cadet Jacob Whisenhut was convicted 
of raping a fellow cadet while at field training.209 Cadet Whisenhut’s 
attorney maintained that the sexual activity in question was 
consensual, while the victim testified that she froze when she awoke 
to find the defendant in her sleeping bag. 210  During sentencing 
argument in open court, the prosecutor asked that the panel sentence 
Cadet Whisenhut to fifteen years’ confinement and a dismissal.211 The 
military panel exceeded the prosecutor’s request and sentenced him to 
twenty-one years’ confinement and a dismissal.212 At the very same 
time that the trial was ongoing, the convening authority who 
personally selected the panel members from within his command to 
hear Cadet Whisenhut’s case, Lieutenant General Robert Caslen Jr., 
testified in front of Congress along with the other service academy 
superintendents regarding their efforts to eliminate sexual assault and 
 
207.  See R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, 314 (Can.) (invalidating the 
practice as violative of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms); Findlay v. 
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European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).   
208.  Behan, supra note 54, at 289–98. 
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Classmate, NEW YORK UPSTATE (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.newyorkupstate.com/hudson-
valley/2017/05/west_point_cadet_found_guilty_of_sexual_assault_of_classmate.h
tml.   
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HERALD-RECORD (May 1, 2017), 
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211.  This information based on author’s personal interview of prosecutor in the 
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harassment at the military academies.213 During his remarks, General 
Caslen testified to Congress that one of his top priorities was the 
elimination of sexual assault.214 He then proceeded to provide detailed 
information on his efforts to do so.215   
Two years later, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals reversed 
Whisenhut’s conviction and dismissed the charges on a finding of 
factual insufficiency. 216 The court reversed pursuant to Article 66 of 
the UCMJ, which essentially grants the court de novo review of court-
martial convictions, a much broader standard than that found in 
civilian appellate courts: “The Court may affirm only such findings of 
guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as the 
Court finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the 
entire record, should be approved.”217 The court concluded that it was 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt in this case.218 Given this 
sequence of events and the subsequent reversal by the Army Court of 
Criminal Appeals, a reasonable observer cannot help but to suspect 
that General Caslen’s testimony influenced the deliberations of the 
panel members in Whisenhut’s case.     
Much has been written on the issue of convening authority 
selection of panel members over the past 100 years.219 This article will 
not address the substantive arguments on both sides. It should be 
enough to note this additional dynamic of command emphasis on 
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sexual assault and its effects on (1) the perception of fairness of trials, 
and (2) the actual bias of panel members who see themselves as 
executing their commander’s initiatives to eliminate sexual assault 
instead of fairly adjudicating guilt and innocence, as was seen in 
United States v. Schloff and which was potentially implicated in 
United States v. Whisenhut. At a minimum, the current environment 
has shifted to the degree that it might be necessary to re-examine 
whether a change is warranted.   
B. Incorporate Civilian Judges into Courts-Martial  
The Stanford Law Review suggested this model in 1950 as a 
possible means of further addressing command influence, in a nod to 
the British practice.220 Under this model, a civilian “Judge Martial” 
presided over all general courts-martial, appointed by a civilian “Chief 
Judge Martial.”221 This model was criticized because it still allowed 
for panel-members personally selected by the commander acting as 
the convening authority, and command influence was still possible.222 
This 1950 proposal has been overtaken somewhat by subsequent 
reforms to the law member process in 1968. At that time, Congress 
amended the UCMJ to create the office of military judge, with powers 
akin to civilian judges.223 Military judges are now answerable only to 
their judicial chain of command to their respective Judge Advocate 
General. 224  As discussed earlier in the article, more recently the 
UCMJ was amended in 2016 to give military judges tenure of 
protected terms of office.225 While some of the cases discussed in this 
article implicated some of the services’ Judge Advocates General for 
UCI, and CAAF has expressed frustration with the military trial and 
appellate judiciary, movement to such a system would be premature. 
In addition, implementation of such a system would require civilian 
judges to be able to serve in a combat zone to hear cases, as 
operational requirements will likely require this option.226 
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C. Create Three-Judge Panels to Try Cases  
This proposal was also made by Stanford Law Review in 1950, 
which noted that almost every other country, save Britain and the 
United States, follow this practice.227 Under such a model, a three-
judge panel would hear a general court-martial case against an 
accused and decide upon guilt and sentence in lieu of a jury-type 
military panel.228 Such a model is very similar to the civil law-style 
inquisitorial system, in contrast to the adversarial model that is the 
feature of the American system. Under such a system, convening 
authorities would still refer cases, but would not be required to select 
panel members and the absence of members would remove 
opportunities for command influence. This model has the possibility 
of removing almost all opportunity for command influence, assuming 
again that the three-judge panels themselves were not subject to 
command influence. However, such a model is foreign to the 
American common-law jury system and is unlikely to gain traction.     
VI. CONCLUSION 
As stated in the introduction, the appellate decisions profiled in 
this article appear to be the dead canary in the mineshaft, indicating 
that unlawful command influence is threatening the integrity of the 
military justice system. The political campaign to remove commander 
jurisdiction due to the military’s handling of sexual assault cases 
seems to have died down more recently, and the cases discussed in 
this article may be relics of the political controversy that existed in 
2013-2014. That said, continued scrutiny by CAAF is likely; and 
continued appellate reversals of sexual assault convictions might re-
ignite the move to remove jurisdiction if it is perceived that the 
military cannot adhere to norms of fundamental fairness in trying 
these cases. In addition, the political response to the recent Whisenhut 
decision may result in actions which raise additional fairness 
concerns. In particular, withdrawal of the broad Article 66 review 
authority from military appellate courts as a result of the Whisenhut 
decision would remove another check on UCI.    
There are multiple considerations at play in addressing the 
problem of sexual assault in the military—constitutional, military, 
political and societal, to name a few. While there are concerns about 
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due process rights of those accused of sexual assault, the issues raised 
in this article should be equally concerning for victims whose cases 
get sidetracked by legal battles associated with UCI and which are 
reversed on appeal due to these legal issues. The cases cited in this 
article involve three such victims who will now have to undergo the 
rigors of a second trial due to reversals on appeal and two who will 
receive no recourse due to the charges against their assailants being 
dismissed with prejudice.   
All involved in military justice should be concerned whether these 
trends indicate a larger problem. Both Congress and senior 
commanders should be cognizant of unintended messages that their 
actions send and the potential of their actions to undermine the 
appearance of fairness of the court-martial system. At a minimum, 
these cases should remind those involved with the military justice 
system of the continued need for vigilance and professionalism in 
order to maintain the viability of the military justice system. 
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